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Abstract 
  In Romania, the 2008 local elections were held based on a new electoral law. The 
main changes concerned the election of chairpersons of county councils by uninominal 
voting,  shifting  of  the  general  and  presidential  elections  and  the  introduction  of  a 
uninominal  voting  system  for  parliamentary  elections,  with  a  correction  of  the  total 
number of seats according to the total number of votes obtained by each party on national 
level. Voting behavior in local elections on 1st June 2008 was primarily determined by 
political reasons (loyal voters) and was influenced by the effect of the local leaders and 
the noise produced by ethnic vote. For all parties, prominent leaders drew votes. Inertia in 
voting  behavior  (electorate’s  fidelity)  influenced  all  parties’  results  and  the  ethnic 
behavior had a strong effect on nationalist parties. At regional level, the electoral impact 
of economic variables was marginal. 
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1. Electoral process in Romania - institutions, rules, outcomes. 
 
  Romania's  EU  membership  imposed  a  harmonization  of  Romanian  legislation 
with the common acquis, meaning supplementing the local elections law (67/2004) with a 
set  of  rules  governing  a  non-discriminatory  manner  regarding  Romanian  citizens,  the 
conditions on which EU citizens must meet to exercise their right to elect and be elected 
to  local  government  authorities  in  Romania,  in  accordance  with  Council  Directive 
94/80/EC of 19 December 1994
2. 
  In Romania, Law no. 67/2004, republished
3, regulating elections for local public 
administration authorities  - local councils, county councils and mayors. By law, local 
councils, county councils, mayors and chairmen of county councils
4 are elected by means 
                                                   
1 Early version of this paper was published in Romanian Journal of Regional Science, vol.4, no. 2, 2010. 
2 Council Directive 94/80/EC of 19 December 1994 to establish procedures for exercising the right to vote 
and to stand in local elections by Union citizens residing in a Member State without citizenship, amended. 
3 Republished in the Official Journal, Part I, no. 333 of May 17, 2007, pursuant to Art. II of Government 
Emergency Ordinance no. 8 / 2005 amending and supplementing Law no. 67/2004 for the election of local 
authorities, published in the Official Journal, Part I, no. 175 of March 1 , 2005, approved by Law no. 
131/2005, published in the Official Journal, Part I, nr. 420 from 18 May 2005 (a new counting system for 
the texts). Law no. 67/2004 published in the Official Journal, Part I, no. 271 from 29 March 2004. 
4 Until the local elections from 1
st June 2008, according to art. 1 align. (5) from Law no. 67/2004, the 
presidents and the vice-presidents of the local councils, as well as the vice-mayors, were indirectly elected   2 
of a universal, equal, direct, secret, and freely expressed ballot. Local councils and county 
councils  shall  be  elected  in  constituencies,  based  on  electoral  lists,  according  to  the 
principle of proportional representation. The mayors of communes, towns, municipalities, 
Bucharest  Municipality  districts, and the general  mayor  of the Bucharest Municipality 
shall be  elected  in  constituencies,  by  means  of uninominal voting.  For  election of the 
local  councils  and  mayors,  each  commune,  town,  municipality  and  administrative-
territorial sub-division of the municipality represents a constituency. For election of the 
county councils, president of county council and the General Council of the Bucharest 
Municipality, each county, respectively Bucharest Municipality, represent a constituency. 
  Elections  for  councillors,  mayors  and  chairmen  of  county  councils  are  valid, 
regardless  of the number  of  voters  who  participated  in the  vote (Art. 95). In  order  to 
distribute  the  councillor’s  seats,  the  constituency  election  bureau  shall  establish  the 
election threshold  of the constituency, representing 5%  of the total  number of validly 
expressed  votes  in  that  constituency.  In  the  case  of  political  alliances
5  or  electoral 
alliances
6, 2% shall be added to the 5 % threshold for the second member of the alliance. 
For alliances of at least 3 members, the election threshold is 8%. 
  For County Council chairman, candidate in the first round who obtained the 
highest number of votes is declared the winner. Voting the Chairmen of County Councils 
by direct vote was a strong premise for changing the stru cture of power within the 
parties
7. 
  For the mayor’s position, the candidate having obtained the majority (50%+1) of 
the validly  expressed  votes  shall  be  pronounced  mayor. If  none  of the candidates  has 
obtained the majority of the validly expressed votes, a second ballot shall be organized. A 
second ballot shall also be organized in the event of a tie between several candidates to 
the mayor’s position. Only the candidates ranking first and second and the candidates in a 
tie, respectively, shall participate in the second ballot. The second ballot shall take place 
two weeks after the first ballot and the person who obtains the most number of votes 
becomes the major. 
  A year before the normal expiration of the seat there are no longer hold elections 
for  local  councils,  county  councils,  mayors,  the  General  Council  of  Bucharest  or  the 
capital's Mayor.  
  Vice-presidents of the councils and deputy mayors are elected indirectly by secret 
ballot by the county councils or local councils, respectively. 
 
Local Elections - June 2008 
  In Romania, local elections took place on June, the 1
st, 2008. Where appropriate, 
the second round was organized on June, the 15
th, and in some cases a repetition or a third 
round  was  organized.  Percentage  of  the  voters’  participation  in  elections  to  appoint 
representatives  of  the  county  councils  on  June  1
st  was  50.67%  and  to  appoint 
representatives  to  local  councils  and  mayors  was  48.81%.  For  Bucharest,  the  rate  of 
                                                                                                                                                        
by the county councils, respectively local councils. In March 2008 (OUG no. 32 from 19
th March 2008), the 
Government  decided  to  change  the  procedure  for  electing  the  presidents  of  the  county  councils,  by 
modifying  and supplementing the  Law 67/2004 for  electing the local public  administrative  authorities, 
republished in Official Journal of  Romania, Part. I, no. 333 from 17
th May 2007. 
5 Political alliances are associations between political parties, based on an association protocol registered to 
Tribunal of Bucharest, according to the Law of Political Parties.  
6  Electoral alliances are associations between political parties and / or political alliances and / or 
organizations of citizens belonging to national minorities, in order to participate in elections, registered in 
the electoral responsible authority. 
7 "Ovidiu Şincai" Institute, Report on Parliamentary Elections of November 30
th, 2008, February 1
st, 2009, 
Bucharest, p. 5.   3 
voters’  participation  in  elections  for  the  designation  of  the  General  Council  and  the 
Mayor of Bucharest on June, the 1
st was 31.36%, while on second round on June, the 15
th 
was 31.49%. 
  On local elections from June 2008, the Permanent Electoral Authority considered 
that, although  elections  were generally organized and took place  within  normal limits, 
respecting existing legal framework, however, "in the context of the changes in electoral 
laws  by  introducing  uninominal  voting  system  also  for  electing  presidents  of  county 
councils, it seems that the reduction of the number of voting citizens leads to an increase 
of  the  importance  in  local  elections,  leading  to  increased  virulence  in  some  cases  in 
election campaigns and electoral confrontations, the emergence of the trading phenomena 
of  votes  or  the  financial  corruption  of  some  categories  of  voters."
8.  However, 




Electoral results – Local elections, June 2008 
  Electoral Competitors 
Number of seats 










1.  Social Democrat Party 
(afterwards PSD)  17  436  661  28.22%  26.67% 
2.  Democrat Liberal Party 
(afterwards PDL)  14  434  473  28.38%  27.70% 
3.  National Liberal Party  
(afterwards PNL)  5  289  355  18.64%  18.08% 
4. 
Democratic Union of 
Hungarians in Romania 
(afterwards UDMR) 
4  89  148  5.43%  4.75% 
5.  Conservative Party 
(afterwards PC) 
–  16  10  3.31%  3.71% 
6. 
Greater Romania Party 
(afterwards PRM)  –  12  3  3.65%  3.70% 
7. 
New Generation Party 
– Christian Democratic  –  5  2  2.79%  3.53% 
8.  Independent Candidate  –  1  15  0.41%  3.38% 







***)  41  1338  1708  100%  100% 
*) Democratic Forum of Germans of Romania 
**) Over 40 other electoral competitors 
***)  The  total  does  not  include  the  Mayor  of  the  Capital  or  the  General  Council  of 
Bucharest.   
Source: Central Electoral Bureau for election of Local Public Administration Authorities– 
2008, http://www.beclocale2008.ro/rezultate.html 
 
                                                   
8 Permanent electoral authority, Report on the organization and deployment  for election of Local Public 
Administration Authorities from June 2008, p. 121-122, http://www.roaep.ro/ 
9 idem, p. 128.   4 
  We intend to analyse the factors – political or economic – witch might explain the 
vote-behaviour’s creation for the local elections from 2008, more precisely, the election – 
for the first time using direct voting – of the presidents of local counties. 
  We estimate an equation like: 
    P(partyi) = f(political variable, economic variables, errors term) 
where  P(partyi) = probability that a representative  of i  party (PDL, PSD, PNL) to be 
elected president of the local county. As a proxy for political variables, we have used the 
percentage  of  the  votes  gained  by  party  i  for  local  county  councilors  from  the  total 
eligible votes for that particular county. 
  For Democrat Liberal Party (PDL), the model is presented in the following tables: 
 
Dependent Variable: P(PDL)   
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 42       
Included observations: 42     
Convergence achieved after 6 iterations   
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          Political variable  0.336043  0.125135  2.685436  0.0072 
Average monthly net earnings  -0.007923  0.003014  -2.628944  0.0086 
GDP index  -0.203780  0.114543  -1.779079  0.0752 
Employment index  0.866583  0.366561  2.364087  0.0181 
         
          Mean dependent var  0.333333     S.D. dependent var  0.477119 
S.E. of regression  0.308651     Akaike info criterion  0.684205 
Sum squared resid  3.620089     Schwarz criterion  0.849697 
Log likelihood  -10.36830     Hannan-Quinn criter.  0.744864 
Avg. log likelihood  -0.246864       
         
          Obs with Dep=0  28      Total obs  42 
Obs with Dep=1  14       
                      The obtained results are econometrically significant and in accordance with the 
theoretical forecasts: the political variables have a positive influence on the probability of 
the election of president of the local county and the increase in wages and the economic 
dynamics  affect  in  a  negative  way  the  opposing  party  (PDL).  The  increase  of  the 
employment ratio has a positive influence on the election chances of a right-wing party.
  Regarding  the  correct  forecast  of  the  electoral  success  probability  for  the 
representative of the PDL (probability is greater than 0.5), the results are the following: 
  
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Equation: EQ_PRESCJ_PDL       
Success cutoff: C = 0.5       
             
                Estimated Equation  Constant Probability 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
             
              P(Dep=1)<=C  25  4  29  28  14  42 
P(Dep=1)>C  3  10  13  0  0  0 
Total  28  14  42  28  14  42   5 
Correct  25  10  35  28  0  28 
% Correct  89.29  71.43  83.33  100.00  0.00  66.67 
% Incorrect  10.71  28.57  16.67  0.00  100.00  33.33 
Total Gain*  -10.71  71.43  16.67       
Percent Gain**  NA  71.43  50.00       
             
                Estimated Equation  Constant Probability 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
             
              E(# of Dep=0)  24.61  3.45  28.06  18.67  9.33  28.00 
E(# of Dep=1)  3.39  10.55  13.94  9.33  4.67  14.00 
Total  28.00  14.00  42.00  28.00  14.00  42.00 
Correct  24.61  10.55  35.16  18.67  4.67  23.33 
% Correct  87.88  75.36  83.71  66.67  33.33  55.56 
% Incorrect  12.12  24.64  16.29  33.33  66.67  44.44 
Total Gain*  21.22  42.03  28.15       
Percent Gain**  63.65  63.04  63.35       
             
              *Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
  The gain generated by the model is modest (16,67%). 
 
  For Social Democrat Party (PSD), the model is descripted below: 
   
 
Dependent Variable: P(PSD)   
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 42       
Included observations: 42     
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations   
GLM Robust Standard Errors & Covariance   
Variance factor estimate = 0.771216013893 
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives 
         
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          Constant term  -15.39424  4.585747  -3.356976  0.0008 
Political variable  0.230744  0.073948  3.120370  0.0018 
Average monthly net earnings  0.005492  0.002580  2.128795  0.0333 
Unemployment rate  0.412420  0.251929  1.637052  0.1016 
         
          McFadden R-squared  0.468274     Mean dependent var  0.428571 
S.D. dependent var  0.500870     S.E. of regression  0.365105 
Akaike info criterion  0.916717     Sum squared resid  5.065469 
Schwarz criterion  1.082209     Log likelihood  -15.25105 
Hannan-Quinn criter.  0.977376     Restr. log likelihood  -28.68214 
LR statistic  26.86218     Avg. log likelihood  -0.363120 
Prob(LR statistic)  0.000006       
         
          Obs with Dep=0  24      Total obs  42 
Obs with Dep=1  18         6 
                    The political variables have a positive influence on the probability of the election 
of  president  of  the  local  county  (PSD).  Also,  the  increase  of  wages  and  of  the 
unemployment rate have a positive impact (PSD is considered a center-left wing party).  
  Regarding  the  correct  forecast  of  the  electoral  success  probability  for  the 
representative of the PSD (probability is greater than 0.5), the results are the following: 
 
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Equation: EQ_PRESCJ_PSD       
Date: 06/10/11   Time: 23:30       
Success cutoff: C = 0.5       
             
                Estimated Equation  Constant Probability 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total   Dep=0 Dep=1  Total 
             
              P(Dep=1)<=C  21  3  24  24  18  42 
P(Dep=1)>C  3  15  18  0  0  0 
Total  24  18  42  24  18  42 
Correct  21  15  36  24  0  24 
% Correct  87.50  83.33  85.71  100.00  0.00  57.14 
% Incorrect  12.50  16.67  14.29  0.00  100.00  42.86 
Total Gain*  -12.50  83.33  28.57       
Percent Gain**  NA  83.33  66.67       
             
                Estimated Equation        Constant Probability 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
             
              E(# of Dep=0)  19.04  4.96  24.00  13.71  10.29  24.00 
E(# of Dep=1)  4.96  13.04  18.00  10.29  7.71  18.00 
Total  24.00  18.00  42.00  24.00  18.00  42.00 
Correct  19.04  13.04  32.07  13.71  7.71  21.43 
% Correct  79.32  72.43  76.37  57.14  42.86  51.02 
% Incorrect  20.68  27.57  23.63  42.86  57.14  48.98 
Total Gain*  22.18  29.57  25.35      
Percent Gain**  51.75  51.75  51.75       
             
              *Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation 
 
  The gain from the model is 28.57%. 
 
  For National Liberal Party (PNL), the model is: 
Dependent Variable: P(PNL) 
Method: ML - Binary Logit (Quadratic hill climbing) 
Sample: 1 42 
Included observations: 42 
Convergence achieved after 5 iterations 
QML (Huber/White) standard errors & covariance 
 
 
       
          Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  z-Statistic  Prob.   
         
          Political variable  0.200742  0.137210  1.463025  0.1435   7 
GDP index  0.121869  0.055662  2.189463  0.0286 
GDP index(-1)  0.106657  0.072094  1.479420  0.1390 
Average monthly net earnings  -0.005117  0.003108  -1.646590  0.0996 
Unemployment rate  -0.377081  0.183684  -2.052877  0.0401 
         
          Mean dependent var  0.142857      S.D. dependent var  0.354169 
S.E. of regression  0.274579      Akaike info criterion  0.740641 
Sum squared resid  2.789567      Schwarz criterion  0.947507 
Log likelihood  -10.55347      Hannan-Quinn criter.  0.816466 
Avg. log likelihood  -0.251273       
         
          Obs with Dep=0  36       Total obs  42 
Obs with Dep=1  6       
                      The econometric estimation is not very accurate, in this case the estimators for 
political variable and GDP index(-1) cannot be guaranteed at least at a 90% level. But the 
direction  of the influences are according  with the theoretical  approaches: PNL  was in 
office in 2008 (right-wing party).  
  Regarding  the  correct  prediction  of  the  success  probabilities  for  the  PNL 
representative (probability is greater than 0.5), the results are: 
 
Expectation-Prediction Evaluation for Binary Specification 
Equation: EQ_PRESCJ_PNL       
Success cutoff: C = 0.5       
             
                           Estimated Equation             Constant Probability 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
             
              P(Dep=1)<=C  35  4  39  36  6  42 
P(Dep=1)>C  1  2  3  0  0  0 
Total  36  6  42  36  6  42 
Correct  35  2  37  36  0  36 
% Correct  97.22  33.33  88.10  100.00  0.00  85.71 
% Incorrect  2.78  66.67  11.90  0.00  100.00  14.29 
Total Gain*  -2.78  33.33  2.38       
Percent Gain**  NA  33.33  16.67       
             
                           Estimated Equation             Constant Probability 
  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total  Dep=0  Dep=1  Total 
             
              E(# of Dep=0)  33.04  2.94  35.98  30.86  5.14  36.00 
E(# of Dep=1)  2.96  3.06  6.02  5.14  0.86  6.00 
Total  36.00  6.00  42.00  36.00  6.00  42.00 
Correct  33.04  3.06  36.09  30.86  0.86  31.71 
% Correct  91.77  50.96  85.94  85.71  14.29  75.51 
% Incorrect  8.23  49.04  14.06  14.29  85.71  24.49 
Total Gain*  6.06  36.67  10.43       
Percent Gain**  42.39  42.78  42.59       
             
               
*Change in "% Correct" from default (constant probability) specification 
**Percent of incorrect (default) prediction corrected by equation   8 
 
Parliamentary elections - November 2008  
  Romanian Parliament is bicameral and comprises the Chamber of Deputies and 
Senate.  The  parliamentary  elections  in  Romania  shall  be  conducted  by  observing  the 
universal, equal, direct, secret, and freely expressed nature of the vote. Romanian citizens 
who have attained the age of 18 years, residing at home or abroad are entitled to vote (and 
to  be  elected)  regardless  of  race,  sex,  nationality,  ethnic  origin,  language,  religion, 
political opinion, wealth or social origin. Exceptions are mentally defective or alienated 
people, laid under an interdiction, or the persons convicted to the loss of the electoral 
rights, by final judgment. Citizen participation in elections is based on their free will.  
  November  2008  elections  were  the  first  parliamentary  elections  in  Romania 
separated from Presidential elections. If for the election during 1990-2004 the Presidential 
candidates  seemed to  work as an  election  locomotive  for the party,  this time  political 
parties  acknowledged  the  personalization  of  political  life  and  launched  their  own 
candidates for prime minister, although this feature is not directly eligible. In addition, 
since the 2008 elections, deputies and senators were elected in uninominal colleges by 
uninominal voting according to proportional representation.
10 Organizations of citizens 
belonging to national minorities, legally constituted, which did not obtained at least one 
seat  of deputy or senator are entitled to one deputy  seat, if they obtained, on entire 
country level, a number of votes equal to at least 10% of the average number of valid  cast 
votes on country level to elect a deputy.  
  The most important change to the electoral law for the election of 2008 (Law no. 
35/2008) is the replacement of the party lists voting with uninominal voting system. Thus, 
each electoral competition (political party, political or electoral alliance, minority party, 
independent candidate) has the possibility to register a single candidate in a college. 
  In November 2008, comp etitors ran for 452 electoral seats in the Romanian 
Parliament: 315 seats for the Chamber of Deputies (7717 candidates: 7689 from the 30 
political parties and 28 independents) and 137 for Senate (895 candidates: 892 candidates 
from 30 political parties and three independents).  
  Distribution of  seats was made  using a  multi-stage system.  The first step  is to 
collect the data  at a national level  and to identify political parties which exceeded  the 
electoral threshold (number of votes obtained more than 5% of  the cast votes, both the 
Senate and the Chamber of Deputies
11, or have obtained 6 deputy seats and three seats in 
the Senate by an absolute majority, defined as 50% +1 of the votes). Next move  is to 
allocate the  seats on electoral competitors (parties, alliances, formations of minorities, 
independents),  in  two stages. First, the electoral  bureau  of  constituency shall set the 
electoral coefficient determined by as the integer part resulted from dividing the number 
of validly cast votes by the total number of  Deputies and Senators. For each electoral 
competitor they shall divide the total number of validly cast votes  by this coefficient. The 
integer  result obtained shall constitute the number of  seats allocated by the electoral 
bureau of constituency to the ele ctoral competitor in the first stage . Each independent 
candidate shall be granted a  seat  by the electoral bureau of constituency if they have 
obtained the majority of the validly cast votes in the  Uninominal College in which they 
                                                   
10 Rule of representation for the Chamber of Deputies  was a deputy to 70,000 inhabitants and for the 
Senate, one Senator to 160,000 inhabitants. 
11  in the case of the political alliances and electoral alliances, to the threshold of 5% they shall add, for the 
second member of the alliance, 3% of the validly cast votes in all the constituencies and, for each member 
of  the  alliance,  beginning  with  the  third  one,  one  percentage  of  the  validly  cast  votes  in  all   the 
constituencies, without exceeding 10% of these votes.   9 
stood for election. The votes remained, that is the unused ones or those inferior to the 
electoral coefficient, obtained by the electoral competitors, as well as the seats that could 
not be allocated  by the electoral bureau of constituency shall be  communicated to the 
Central Electoral Bureau, in order to be allocated by centralization in the second stage, at 
national level, using the Hondt method. This election mechanism, in which nominations 
are held in constituencies and the distribution of seats is done by proportional rule has no 
precedent in Europe and led to the situation that 25% of senator or deputy seats may not 
be granted to the first ranked competitor in constituencies
12.  
  Parliamentary elections in Romania (Chamber of Deputies and Senate) were held 
on November, the 30
th, 2008, with a participation rate of 39.20%.  
  Following the aggregation of valid votes for the Chamber of Deputies, a total of 
334  seats  were  awarded.  316  from  these  seats  were  allocated  to  political  parties, 
organizations  of  citizens  belonging  to  national  minorities,  political  alliances,  electoral 
alliances,  independent  candidates.  18  seats  were  allocated  to  members  of  national 
organizations  that  have  obtained  at  least  10%  of  the  national  established  electoral 
coefficient.  The  November,  the  30
th  elections  led  to  a  diminution  of  the  number  of 
parliamentary parties on the Romanian scene: PSD + PC, PD-L, PNL, UDMR.   



















Chamber of Deputies – total number and percentage of the obtained seats by the political 
entities – elections from 30
th November 2008  
 
  For Senate, a total number of 137 seats were distributed. 
                                                   
12 The procedure is described in Articles 47 and 48 of the Voting System Law (Law for the election of the 
Chamber of Deputies and the Senate and for amending and supplementing Law no. 67/2004 for the election 
of local authorities, the local government Act no. 215/2001 and Law no. 393/2004 on the status of local 
elected officials, law no. 35/2008), published in the Official Journal, Part I no. 196 of 03.13.2008. The two 
articles  count  22  paragraphs.  Simplified  description is  taken  from  the  Report  on  November  30
th,  2008 
parliamentary elections Ovidiu Sincai Institute, February 1














Senate – total number and percentage of the obtained seats by the political entities – 
elections from 30
th November 2008   
 
  The electoral system adopted for parliamentary elections in November 2008 was 
relatively  complicated  and  led  to  some  problems  in  the  distribution  of  seats.  Thus, 
although the use of Voting System was the goal for changing the electoral system, results 
showed that only 21% of senators and of 26% deputies entered the Parliament by direct 
vote  (comprising  over  50%  of  the  cast  votes),  while  the  remaining  candidates  have 
benefited  from  a  redistribution  system.  Redistribution  led  to  situations  of  inequity  by 
making it possible for a candidate who obtained 49.6% of votes in its favor not to enter 
the  Parliament
13, while another candidate with only 34 votes  to obtain a  seat
14. Also, 
situations when candidates from a constituency were ranked third in peoples’ options, to 
enter into the Parliament as a result of redistribution of votes on national level, and the 
situation  that  candidates  situated  on  the  top  positions  received  any  seat.  However, 
nationally, the chosen system allowed a proportional representation of political choices of 
voters. 
 
Presidential election - November 2009  
  Elections  for President of Romania  from 22
nd November – 6
th December 2009 
were conducted in accordance with Law no. 370/2004, as amended and supplemented, 
supplemented by Government Emergency Ordinance no. 95/2009.
 15  
  According to the new electoral law that marks the difference between the term of 
President’s seat (5 years) and duration of the seat of Parliament (four years) for the first 
time  in  Romanian  politics,  election  of  the  President  of  Romania  was  not  held 
                                                   
13 PSD candidate Lucian Băluţ, ranked first in the constituency of Constanta with 49.6% of the vote, did not 
obtain a mandate, while UDMR candidate, Joseph Koto, obtained a mandate with only 34 votes (2% of 
votes in his constituency)! 
14 Permanent electoral authority, Report on the organization and deployment  for election of Chamber of 
Deputies and Senate from November 30
th,2008, p. 121-122, http://www.roaep.ro/ 
15 Government Emergency Ordinance no. 95/2009 amending and supplementing Law no. 370/2004 for the 
election of the President of Romania, published in Official Journal no. 608 of September 3, 2009.    11 
simultaneously with elections for the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate. Instead, its 
first round of electing the President of Romania overlapped with the time of the national 
referendum held on the initiative of the President in office, on the shift from a bicameral 
Parliament  in  an  unicameral  Parliament  and  reducing  the  number  of  Parliament’s 
members to the maximum of 300. The first round of Presidential elections was set on 
November 22
nd, 2009, and the second round was scheduled two weeks later (December 
6
th, 2009).  
  In due time, a total of 29 applications were made, of which the Central Electoral 
Bureau admitted 12 (3 - of the independent candidates and 9 from political parties)
 16. The 
percentage of voters was 54.37%, over 15 percentage points higher than in parliamentary 
elections (39.20%).  
 
Results for Presidential elections – 1
st round, 22
nd , November 2009 
    Valid cast votes 
No. 
crt. 
Name  and  surname  of  the 
candidate 
Number   % of total 
number 
1  Traian BĂSESCU (PD-L)  3153640  32.44% 
2  Mircea-Dan GEOANĂ (PSD)  3027838  31.15% 
3  Crin ANTONESCU (PNL)  1945831  20.02% 
4  Corneliu VADIM-TUDOR (PRM)  540380  5.56% 
5  Hunor KELEMEN (UDMR)  373764  3.83% 
6  Sorin OPRESCU (independent)  309764  3.18% 
7  George BECALI (PNGcd)  186390  1.19% 
Source: Central Electoral Bureau for election of the President of Romania from 2009, first 
round results, November, 22
nd, 2009, http://www.bec2009p.ro/rezultate.html  
 
  The other five candidates have obtained each a percentage less than 1% of votes, 
which means less than the required minimum number of supporters that was presented to 
support the application (200,000 supporters).  
  In the second round, held on December 6
th, 2009, the first two runners competed 
and the turnout has been higher, 58.02%. Traian Băsescu, the President in office, won by 
a close  shave  the  Presidential elections,  with a difference  of less than  one percentage 
point from the PSD candidate (50.33% vs. 49.66%, nearly 70,000 additional votes, from a 
total of 10,500,000 valid votes).  
  As Election Observation Mission OSCE / ODIHR
17 assessed: "The elections for 
President of Romania in 2009 took place in an atmosphere characterized by respect for 
fundamental political freedoms and were conducted generally in accordance with OSCE 
commitments and  international  standards  for  democratic elections and  with  national 
legislation. Although authorities have taken steps to correct some deficiencies observed in 
the first round and to investigate irregularities, further efforts are needed to address 
remaining  weaknesses  in  order  to  improve  election  process  and  to  enhance  public 
confidence"
18. 
   
                                                   
16 Applications rejected did not meet certain criteria imposed by the electoral law: in most cases, were not 
accompanied by a list of at least 200,000 supporters. 
17 OSCE/ODIHR means Organization for Security and Co -operation in Europe / Office for Democra tic 
Institutions and Human Rights 
18 Romania, Presidential Elections, November 22
nd and December 6
th, 2009 – Final Report of Election 
Observation Mission OSCE / ODIHR, cited by the Permanent Electoral Authority, the  White Paper for 
Election of President of Romania 2009, p. 103, http://www.roaep.ro/   12 
2. Political determination of voting 
   
  Given  that  for  the  parliamentary  elections  from  November  2008,  deputies  and 
senators  were  elected  in  single-member  constituencies,  through  single-member  district 
elections, according to proportional representation and, for local elections, presidents of 
county councils are elected through uninominal voting and county councillors by direct 
vote  on  the  lists,  we  analyzed  the  impact  of  local  representation  on  the  vote  in 
parliamentary elections. Political impact model is: 
    cdij = a0,ij + a1,ij∙cjij + a2,ij∙prescjij + eij,     (1) 
where  cdij   – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i in county j, to the 
total  number  of  valid  votes  in  that  county,  in  the  elections  to  the 
Chamber of Deputies, in November 2008; 
  cjij  – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i in county j, to the 
total number of valid votes in that county, in the elections to the Local 
Councils, June 2008; 
  prescjij – dummy variable, prescjij = 1, when party i won the presidency of County 
Council j,  local elections in June 2008 and prescjij = 0, otherwise; 
  a0,ij…  – parameters of the model; 
  eij  – error of regression equation, random variable. 
 
  The model was estimated only for parties that exceed the electoral threshold and, 
consequently,  have  parliamentary  representation:  the  Social  Democratic  Party  + 
Conservative  Party (PSD + PC), Democratic  -  Liberal Party (PD-L), National  Liberal 
Party  (PNL)  and  Democratic  Union  of  Hungarians  in  Romania  (UDMR).  The  results 
confirm a panel model, with specific effects for constant terms and common effects for 
explanatory variables. Accepted model is the following: 
    cdij = a0,i + a1∙cjij + a2∙prescjij + eij,      (1') 
where 
  a0,i  – represents the constant in the regression equation associated to the party i 
(specific effect); 
  a1, a2  – constant parameters of the model. 
 
The obtained results are presented in the table below: 
    Dependent Variable: CD? 
    Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR) 
    Sample: 1 4 
    Included observations: 4 
    Cross-sections included: 42 
    Total pool (balanced) observations: 168 
   
  Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
a0,PSD  7.131789  0.839826  8.491985  0.0000 
a0,PDL  6.635535  0.945950  7.014680  0.0000 
a0,PNL  2.300443  0.808208  2.846350  0.0050 
a0,UDMR  1.652317  0.405851  4.071237  0.0001 
CJ?  0.708750  0.021673  32.70130  0.0000 
PRESCJ?  4.613843  0.991318  4.654250  0.0000 
  Weighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.955322      Mean dependent var  10.31194   13 
Adjusted R-squared  0.953943      S.D. dependent var  5.212104 
S.E. of regression  1.008735      Sum squared resid  164.8426 
F-statistic  692.7880      Durbin-Watson stat  2.007981 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
  Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.924140      Mean dependent var  22.53792 
Sum squared resid  2944.400      Durbin-Watson stat  2.724072 
 
  A similar model is valid also for the Senate: 
    senij = b0,ij + b1,ij∙cjij + b2,ij∙prescjij + eij,      (2) 
where  senij   – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i in county j, to the 
total number of valid votes in that county, in the elections to the Senate, 
in November 2008; 
  cjij  – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i in county j, to the 
total number of valid votes in that county, in the elections to the Local 
Councils, June 2008; 
  prescjij – dummy variable, prescjij = 1, when party i won the presidency of County 
Council j, local elections in June 2008 and prescjij = 0, otherwise; 
  b0,ij…  – parameters of the model; 
  eij  – error of regression equation, random variable. 
The  same, the tests  validate a  model  with specific  effects  for  constant  terms (b0) and 
common effects for explanatory variables, so that we use the following model: 
    senij = b0,i + b1∙cjij + b2∙prescjij + eij,      (2') 
where 
  b0,i  – represents the constant in the regression equation associated to the party i 
(specific effect); 
  b1, b2  – constant parameters of the model. 
 
The obtained results are presented in the table below: 
    Dependent Variable: SEN? 
    Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR) 
    Sample: 1 4 
    Included observations: 4 
    Cross-sections included: 42 
    Total pool (balanced) observations: 168 
    Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
b0,PSD  7.368119  0.828612  8.892118  0.0000 
b0,PDL  7.230648  0.949825  7.612610  0.0000 
b0,PNL  1.964547  0.813176  2.415893  0.0168 
b0,UDMR  1.748847  0.400904  4.362257  0.0000 
CJ?  0.727403  0.021240  34.24688  0.0000 
PRESCJ?  5.000008  0.982771  5.087664  0.0000 
  Weighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.958652      Mean dependent var  11.20433 
Adjusted R-squared  0.957376      S.D. dependent var  5.891028 
S.E. of regression  1.012407      Sum squared resid  166.0448 
F-statistic  751.1945      Durbin-Watson stat  2.009669 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
  Unweighted Statistics       14 
R-squared  0.929167      Mean dependent var  23.22869 
Sum squared resid  2975.737      Durbin-Watson stat  2.682022 
 
  As a synthesis, the results are: 
 
Chamber of Deputies  Senate 
PSD  PD-L  PNL  UDMR  PSD  PD-L  PNL  UDMR 

























2  0.9553  0.9586 
R
2 adjusted  0.9539  0.9574 
(in brackets, under the estimators, there are standard deviation values; the estimators have 
a confidence level over 95%) 
 
  The results confirm the hypothesis of a political determination of the vote. On 
average, about 70% of political votes in local elections have been preserved up to 
parliamentary elections by the electoral competitors and the presence as the head of 
County Council of a representative of the party fired up the party's election outcomes with 
4.6 - 5 percentage points. 
 
  For Presidential Elections from November 2009 – first  round,  we have  built a 
similar model:  
    prij = c0,ij + c1,ij∙cjij + c2,ij∙prescjij + eij,     (3) 
 
where  prij   – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i for Presidency in 
county  j,  to  the  total  number  of  valid  votes  in  that  county,  in  the 
Presidential Elections in November 2009; 
  cjij  – represents the share of votes won in county j, by the party from which 
the candidate i is, to the total number of valid votes in that county, in the 
elections for the Local Councils, June 2008; 
  prescjij – dummy  variable,  prescjij  =  1,  if  the  party  of  the  candidate  i  won  the 
Presidency of Local County j, in the local elections from June 2008 and 
prescjij = 0, otherwise; 
  b0,ij…  – parameters of the model; 
  eij  – error of regression equation, random variable. 
 
  The tests validate a panel model, with specific effects for constant terms (c0) and 
common effects for explanatory variables, so the model is the following: 
    prij = c0,i + c1∙cjij + c2∙prescjij + eij,      (3') 
where 
  c0,i  – represents the constant in the regression equation associated to the party i 
(specific effect); 
  c1, c2  – constant parameters of the model. 
We  considered  only  the  first  three  candidates,  so  the  previous  description,  i  =  1,  for 
Mircea  Geoana  (PSD  +  PC),  i  =  2  for  Traian  Băsescu  (PD-L)  and  i  =  3  for  Crin 
Antonescu (PNL). The results are: 
  Dependent Variable: PR?   15 
  Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR) 
  Sample: 1 3 
  Included observations: 3 
  Cross-sections included: 42 
  Total pool (balanced) observations: 126 
  Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
CJ?  0.445549  0.033772  13.19286  0.0000 
PRESCJ?  2.303273  1.146651  2.008695  0.0468 
CGeoană  15.71962  1.258790  12.48788  0.0000 
CBăsescu  16.53802  1.189346  13.90514  0.0000 
CAntonescu  8.683501  0.855954  10.14482  0.0000 
  Weighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.826710      Mean dependent var  9.584683 
Adjusted R-squared  0.820982      S.D. dependent var  3.394960 
S.E. of regression  1.016358      Sum squared resid  124.9909 
F-statistic  144.3133      Durbin-Watson stat  2.067084 
Prob(F-statistic)  0.000000       
  Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.747613      Mean dependent var  27.33733 
Sum squared resid  2711.178      Durbin-Watson stat  2.686440 
 
  As shown in the previous equation, a good part of the results  in  Presidential 
elections for the first three candidates can be explained by the conservation of electoral 
behaviour  between  local  and  Presidential  elections  under  the  influence  of  local 
representatives of those parties.  
 
  We also tested a model of political analysis that pursues each candidate’s position 
to the trend recorded for the party that supported him. The model is the following: 
    prij = (c0 + c1∙cdij) + c2,i + eij,        (4) 
 
where  prij   – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i for Presidency in 
county  j,  to  the  total  number  of  valid  votes  in  that  county,  in  the 
Presidential Elections in November 2009; 
  cdij  – represents the share of votes won in county j, by the party from which 
the candidate i is, to the total number of valid votes in that county, in the 
elections for Chamber of Deputies, in November 2008; 
  c …  – parameters of the model; 
  eij  – error of regression equation, random variable. 
The  first  part  of  the  model  estimates  the  overall  national  trend  for  each  party  i.  The 
positive c2,i coefficient means that the obtained votes of the candidate from party i are 
above the regular votes of that party and, obviously, c2,i  < 0 means that in the Presidential 
Elections from 2009, the candidate i scored under the political performances of his party 
We considered this time, the top five candidates (together have 93% of the total valid 
votes in round I of the Presidential election, November 2009). The results are: 
 
  Dependent Variable: PR? 
  Method: Pooled EGLS (Period SUR) 
  Sample: 1 5 
  Included observations: 5   16 
  Cross-sections included: 42 
  Total pool (balanced) observations: 210 
  Linear estimation after one-step weighting matrix 
Variable  Coefficient  Std. Error  t-Statistic  Prob.   
C  5.119204  0.328170  15.59922  0.0000 
CD?  0.730803  0.017064  42.82715  0.0000 
Fixed Effects         
C2 – Geoană (PSD+PC)  2.587327       
C2 – Băsescu (PD-L)  3.855761       
C2 – Antonescu (PNL)  0.095458       
C2 – Kelemen (UDMR)  -5.020011       
C2 – Vadim-Tudor (PRM)  -1.518535       
  Weighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.967887      Mean dependent var  25.91606 
Adjusted R-squared  0.967100      S.D. dependent var  18.70538 
S.E. of regression  1.014598      Sum squared resid  209.9996 
F-statistic  1229.723      Durbin-Watson stat  1.986549 
Prob (F-statistic)  0.000000       
  Unweighted Statistics     
R-squared  0.925412      Mean dependent var  19.06313 
Sum squared resid  3054.200      Durbin-Watson stat  2.424733 
 
  PD-L’s  candidate  (Băsescu)  and  PSD+PC’s  (Geoană)  scored  higher  than  the 
general trend of the party, Liberal candidate (Antonescu) obtained a score according to 
the general tendency of his party. Well below the score of the party which supported him 
stood the UDMR’s candidate. 
 
3. Economic determination of the voting 
  Economic voting is "a special case of the rational-choice perspective on electoral 
behaviour"
19 where the main focus is on the relationship between the voters and the state 
of the macroeconomy. In specific literature there are multiple references to the  economic 
analyses  of electoral  behaviour: Owen and Tucker (20 10), Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 
(2000, 2008), Anderson (2007) and so on
20. As Anderson stated (2007, p. 273), by the 
end of the twentieth century the flow of scholarly papers on the topic had "changed from 
a trickle to a torrent of over 300 articles and books on economics and elections" (Lewis -
Beck and Stegmaier 2000, p. 183) and covered virtually every democracy for which data 
on economics and elections were available. 
  In its most straightforward form, the predominant model of economic voting 
employed in studies of established democracies expects that voters will tend to punish the 
incumbent in bad economic times and reward the incumbent when the economy i s doing 
well. In this framework, elections function much like referenda on economic conditions 
during the incumbent party’s term in office. 
                                                   
19 Han Dorussen and Harvey D. Palmer, “The Context of Economic Voting,” in Economic Voting, ed. Han 
Dorussen and Michaell Taylor (London, Routledge, 2002), quoted in Sari Rannanpää, 2008,  Economic 
Voting  in  Estonia,  Central  European  University,  Department  of  Political  Science, 
http://web.ceu.hu/polsci/teaching/seminarpapers/Sari.pdf 
20 For more on economic voting, see, for example, the 19 articles in special issue of  Electoral Studies: 
Economics and Elections (Volume 19, Number 2/3, June/September 2000).   17 
  In  Paldam  analysis
21, a Vote  function (hereafter  V -function) is defined  as a 
function explaining (the change in) the vote for the government by (changes in) economic 
conditions and other variables. A Popularity function (hereafter P -function) explains (the 
change in) the popularity of the government  – as measured by pools – by (change in) the 
economic conditions and other variables. 
  For Romania, we have studied the impact inducted by the state and dinamics of 
some economic variables on the change of voting intensions. The data are analysed in 
regional structures. We used a Paldam type model. In its most simple linear version the 
function are: 
  ΔPt = {a1Δut + a2Δpt + ….} + [c1D
1
t + c2Dt
2 + …] + et    (5) 
Here Δ is used to indicate the first difference, P is either the vote or the popularity, for the 
political parties, in percent. The as and cs are coefficients to be estimated, and the e is the 
disturbance term. The braces  contain the economic  variables: the  e-part  of the  model. 
Two of the variables are u and p, where u is the rate of unemployment and p the rate of 
price rises. The next set of variables, the ds, are the political variables forming the p-part 
of the model – it is found in the square brackets
22. 
  Concretely,we have analysed a model like: 
    Pij = {a0 + a1∙cjij + a2∙prescjij} + [a3,i(rsnov2008 – rsmai2008)j] + eij,  (5') 
where  Pij   – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i in county j, to the 
total number of valid votes in that county, in the Parliamentary Elections 
from November 2008; 
  cjij  – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i in county j, to the 
total number of valid votes in that county, in the elections for the Local 
Councils, June 2008; 
  prescjij – dummy variable, prescjij = 1, when party i won the Presidency of Local 
County j, Local Elections 2008 and prescjij = 0, otherwise; 
  rsj  – unemployment rate in county j; nov2008 = 30 November 2008, mai2008 
= 31 May 2008; 
  a …  – parameters of the model; 
  eij  – error of regression equation, random variable. 
 
The  used  data  are  in  regional  structures  and  refer  to  the  first  3  parliamentary  parties 
(PSD+PC, PD-L şi PNL). The obtained results are: 
 
Chamber of Deputies  Senate 
PSD  PD-L  PNL  PSD  PD-L  PNL 

























2  0.8397  0.8548 
R
2 adjusted  0.8330  0.8487 
                                                   
21Paldam, Martin. 1991, "How Robust is the Vote Function? A Study of Seventeen Nations over Four 
Decades". In: Helmuth Norpoth, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, and Jean Dominique Lafay (eds.), Economics and 
Politics, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 9- 32. 
22 idem, p. 14.   18 
(in brackets, under the estimators, there are standard deviation values; the estimators have 
a confidence level over 90%) 
  The  results  suggest  an  interpretation  consistent  with  the  theory  of  economic 
voting: in the period June to November 2008, Liberal Party was the party of government. 
Increase of unemployment in regional structures resulted in a penalty for PNL and an 
increase  in  intentions  to  vote  for  opposition  parties  (PSD  and  PDL).  Estimators  are 
econometrically significant. 
  For  Presidential  election,  we  have  built  a  model  where  periods  are  shown 
separately: May 2008 - November 2008 (PNL in office) and November 2008 - November 
2009 (PD-L in office) 
    prij = {a0 + a1∙cjij + a2∙prescjij} + [a3,i(rsnov2008 – rsmai2008)j + 
             + a3,i(rsnov2009 – rsnov2008)j] + eij,    (6) 
where  prij   – represents the share of votes won by the competitor i for Presidency in 
county  j,  to  the  total  number  of  valid  votes  in  that  county,  in  the 
Presidential Elections in November 2009 
  We anticipate, in line  with the  economic voting theory, that a3  is negative  for 
candidates  who  represent  the  ruling  parties  and  positive  for  the  ones  representing 
opposition parties. 
  The results for Presidential elections in November 2009 are not econometrically 
significant. Nor is any other econometric model, in which the results from parliamentary 
elections in November 2008 are regarded as political variables and as economic variables 
are used the change in unemployment between the two time election, or three months 
before the election. Lack of regional statistics for other economic variables discussed in 
the specific literature in the context of vote-popularity functions (e.g. inflation) has not 
allowed  the  construction  of  some  models  with  more  variables.  Subject  to  this 
methodological observation, the conclusion of the tested econometric models is that for 
Presidential elections in Romania, organized in November 2009, the economic voting has 




  Romanian electoral system has undergone significant changes in 2008. The main 
elements of the new introduced electoral law are:  
  Presidents of county councils are elected by universal, equal, direct, secret and 
freely expressed vote. Until the local elections from June 1, 2008, presidents 
of county councils were indirectly elected by the county councils. Under the 
new law, a candidate who, in the first round, obtaining the highest number of 
votes is declared the winner. The election of Chairmen of County Councils by 
direct vote was a strong premise for changing the structure of power within the 
parties; 
  November 2008 elections were the first parliamentary elections in Romania 
separated from Presidential elections. If for the election during 1990-2004 the 
Presidential  candidates  worked  as  a  locomotive  for  the  parties,  this  time 
political  parties  acknowledged  the  personalization  of  political  life  and 
launched their own candidate for prime minister, although this feature is not 
directly eligible. 
  Since the 2008 elections, deputies and senators were elected in single-member 
constituency,  through  single-member  constituency  elections,  according  to 
proportional representation. The most important  change to the electoral law   19 
for  parliamentary  elections  in  2008  refers  to  the  replacement  procedure  of 
voting  on  party  lists  with  the  uninominal  voting  system.  Each  electoral 
competitor (political party, political alliance or electoral party of minorities, 
independent candidate) has the possibility to register a single candidate in a 
constituency. 
  The  econometric  models  built  for  the  Parliamentary  elections  from  November 
2008 confirm the hypothesis of a political determination of the vote. On average, about 
70%  of  political  votes  in  local  elections  have  been  preserved  up  to  parliamentary 
elections by the electoral competitors and the presence as the head of County Council of a 
representative of the party fired up the  party's  election results  with 4.6 - 5 percentage 
points. 
  For the Presidential elections from November 2009, econometrically, a good part 
of the results of Presidential elections for the first three candidates can be explained by 
the conservation of electoral behaviour between local and Presidential elections under the 
influence of local representatives of those parties.   
  Also there are econometric elements for supporting the fact that PD-L’s candidate 
(Băsescu) and PSD+PC’s (Geoană) scored higher than the general trend of the party (on 
national level), and that the Liberal candidate (Antonescu) obtained a score according to 
the general tendency of his party. Well below the score of the party which supported him 
stood the UDMR’s candidate.  
  Regarding the economic voting for the Parliamentary elections from November 
2008, the increase of unemployment in regional structures resulted in a penalty for PNL 
(as the party in office) and an increase in intentions to vote for opposition parties (PSD 
and  PDL).  But  for  the  Presidential  elections  from  November  2009  (round  I),  the 
hypothesis of an economic component in voting behaviour’s creation could not be based 
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